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Constitutional	   law	   scholars1	   have	   analogized	   judicial	   review	   to	  
“dialogue”	   between	   courts	   and	   other	   institutions,	   an	   account	   some	   echo	  
for	   judicial	   review	   in	   administrative	   law.2	   Professor	   Emily	   Hammond	  
Meazell’s	  excellent	  Article,	  Deference	  and	  Dialogue	  in	  Administrative	  Law,3	  
extends	   a	   dialogic	   account	   of	   judicial	   review	   to	   serial	   judicial	   appeals	   of	  
agency	   decisions,	   which	   involve	   iterative	   calls	   for	   judicial	   intervention	  
over	   periods	   that	   can	   span	   decades.	   No	   doubt,	   “dialogue”—roughly	  
defined	   as	   a	   conversation	   “enabl[ing]	   deliberation	   toward	   a	   common	  
end”4—captures	   some	   of	   what	   occurs	   in	   judicial	   review	   of	   agency	  
decisions.	  An	  appeal	  of	  an	  agency	  decision	  can	  result	  in	  a	  back-­‐and-­‐forth,	  
in	   which	   both	   an	   agency	   and	   reviewing	   court	   engage	   in	   a	   discussion	  
grounded	   in	   commonly	   understood	   goals.	   Professor	   Meazell’s	   serial	  
appeal	   case	   studies	   are	   fascinating	   and	   provide	   administrative	   law	   a	  
fertile	   angle	   for	   assessing	   the	   kinds	   of	   substantive	   issues	   that	   arise	   in	  
judicial	  review,	  especially	  the	  role	  of	  deference	  in	  arbitrary	  and	  capricious	  
review.	  
	  
	  Still,	  a	  dialogic	  approach	  to	  judicial	  review	  in	  administrative	  law	  faces	  
some	   challenges.	   Judicial	   review	   is	   notoriously	   burdensome	   for	   both	  
interest	  groups	  and	  agencies,	  presents	  a	  risk	  of	  delay,	  and	  at	  the	  extreme	  
may	   undermine	   statutory	   objectives.	   Without	   doubt,	   iterative	   judicial	  
challenges	   multiply	   and	   prolong	   these	   costs.	   Professor	   Meazell’s	   Article	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1	   See,	   e.g.,	   Barry	   Friedman,	   Dialogue	   and	   Judicial	   Review,	   91	   Mich.	   L.	   Rev.	   577,	   653–80	  
(1993)	   (advancing	   account	   of	   judicial	   review	   grounded	   in	   dialogue	   for	   constitutional	  
matters).	  
2	   See,	   e.g.,	   Christopher	   F.	   Edley,	   Jr.,	   Administrative	   Law:	   Rethinking	   Judicial	   Control	   of	  
Bureaucracy	   201	   (1990)	   (arguing	   courts	   and	   agencies	   should	   have	   “a	   dialogue	   about	  
whether	   and	  how	   the	   political	   discretion	   to	   avoid	   costly	   regulation	   is	   constrained	  by	   law	  
and	  science”);	  Mark	  Seidenfeld,	  A	  Civic	  Republican	   Justification	   for	   the	  Bureaucratic	  State,	  
105	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  1511,	  1550	  (1992)	  (discussing	  how	  judicial	  review	  promotes	  “meaningful	  
dialogue	   between	   court	   and	   agency	   in	   which	   the	   court	   stands	   in	   for	   the	   knowledgeable	  
citizen”).	  
3	  111	  Colum.	  L.	  Rev.	  1722	  (2011)	  [hereinafter	  Meazell,	  Deference	  and	  Dialogue].	  
4	  Id.	  at	  1724	  n.4.	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acknowledges	   and	   addresses	  many	   of	   these	   challenges.	   She	   assesses	   the	  
important	   connection	  between	  dialogue	  and	   judicial	   remedies	  which	  can	  
determine	  whether	  an	  agency	   is	  able	   to	   respond	   to	  a	  court’s	   reversal,	  or	  
instead	   is	   forced	   to	  begin	   the	   regulatory	  process	   all	   over	   again.	   She	   also	  
offers	   a	   number	   of	   recommendations	   to	   improve	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   a	  
dialogic	  approach	  to	  judicial	  review	  of	  substantive	  matters.	  These	  include	  
a	   strong	   endorsement	   of	   remands	   without	   vacation,	   along	   with	   the	  
warning	   that	   courts	   reviewing	   agency	   decisions	   avoid	   mindlessly	  
defaulting	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   deferential	   “rationality”	   review	   that	  
predominates	   in	   constitutional	   law.	   When	   courts	   do	   engage	   in	   more	  
aggressive	   review,	   she	   also	   recommends	   that	   they	   generally	   limit	  
themselves	   to	   reviewing	   the	   reasons	   given	   by	   agencies	   rather	   than	  
judicially	  constructed	  rationales	  that	  might	  support	  an	  agency	  decision.	  At	  
face	   value,	   such	   recommendations	   seem	   uncontroversial	   and	   are	   quite	  
consistent	  with	  the	  mainstream	  view	  of	  many	  administrative	  law	  scholars,	  
as	   well	   as	   well-­‐established	   doctrines	   such	   as	   hard	   look	   review	   and	   the	  
Chenery	  principle.5	  	  
	  
As	  Professor	  Meazell’s	  Article	  illustrates,	  dialogue’s	  descriptive	  power	  
may	  be	  at	   its	  height	   in	  the	  serial	   litigation	  context.	  However,	   in	  this	  brief	  
response,	   I	   raise	   two	   important	   issues	   that	   dialogic	   accounts	   of	   judicial	  
review	  in	  administrative	  law	  have	  not	  sufficiently	  addressed:	  namely,	  both	  
the	   “what”	  and	   the	   “who”	  of	  dialogue.	  The	   “what”	   refers	   to	   the	  nature	  of	  
the	   agency	  decision	  being	   reviewed,	  how	   that	  decision	  was	  made	  within	  
an	   agency’s	   organizational	   structure,	   and,	   perhaps	   most	   importantly,	  
whether	  any	  meaningful	  decision	  was	  made	  at	  all.	  The	  significance	  of	  the	  
“what”	   of	   dialogue	   to	   judicial	   review	   is	   that	   different	   kinds	   of	   agency	  
decisions	   implicate	   different	   types	   of	   issues	   on	   appeal	   and,	   ultimately,	  
might	   engender	   different	   responses	   from	   courts	   regarding	   whether	   a	  
dialogue	  with	  the	  agency	  is	  even	  worth	  having	  in	  the	  first	  instance.	  Equally	  
significant,	   to	   the	   extent	   judicial	   review	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   dialogue,	   “who”	   is	   a	  
reviewing	   court	   speaking	   with?	   Judicial	   review	   certainly	   involves	   the	  
agency	   and	   a	   reviewing	   court	   engaging	   a	   particular	   class	   of	   cases	  
pertaining	  to	  an	  issue	  that	  may	  be	  appealed,	  but	  it	  also	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  
cozy	   court-­‐agency	   conversation.6	   Especially	   in	   the	   context	   of	   serial	  
 
5	  See	  SEC	  v.	  Chenery	  Corp.	  (Chenery	  II),	  332	  U.S.	  194,	  196	  (1947)	  (“[A]	  reviewing	  court	  .	  .	  .	  
must	  judge	  the	  propriety	  of	  [agency]	  action	  solely	  by	  the	  grounds	  invoked	  by	  the	  agency.”);	  
SEC	   v.	   Chenery	   Corp.	   (Chenery	   I),	   318	   U.S.	   80,	   87	   (1943)	   (“The	   grounds	   upon	   which	   an	  
administrative	   order	   must	   be	   judged	   are	   those	   upon	   which	   the	   record	   discloses	   that	   its	  
action	   would	   be	   based.”).	   For	   further	   discussion,	   see	   Kevin	   M.	   Stack,	   The	   Constitutional	  
Foundations	  of	  Chenery,	  116	  Yale	  L.J.	  952	  (2007).	  
6	  Even	  where	  dialogue	  is	  agency-­‐court	  limited,	  and	  does	  not	  involve	  any	  other	  institutions,	  a	  
reviewing	  court	  could	  be	  speaking	  to	  other	  circuits	  or	  panels	  as	  well	  as	  to	  an	  agency.	  In	  this	  
sense,	   as	   occurs	   in	   the	   context	   of	   constitutional	   litigation	   (such	   as	   recent	   challenges	   to	  
national	  health	  legislation),	  a	  development	  of	  legal	  principles	  within	  the	  judiciary	  could	  also	  
influence	  this	  path	  of	  dialogue,	  independent	  of	  any	  extra-­‐judicial	  response.	  While	  this	  might	  
have	   implications	   for	   how	   broadly	   or	   narrowly	   courts	   write	   their	   opinions,	   Professor	  
Meazell	  and	  other	  advocates	  of	  dialogue	  in	  constitutional	  and	  administrative	  law	  advance	  a	  
more	  ambitious	  role	  for	  dialogue	  that	  transcends	  the	  judiciary.	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litigation,	   dialogue	   can	   involve	   other	   institutions;	   to	   the	   extent	  multiple	  
congresses	  and	  presidents	  may	  also	  be	  aware	  of	  issues	  being	  reviewed	  by	  
courts,	   opportunities	   for	   political	   intervention	   may	   play	   as	   significant	   a	  
role	  as	  judicial	  review	  both	  for	  an	  agency	  and	  for	  theories	  of	  legitimacy	  as	  
administrative	  law.	  
	  
I.	  THE	  “WHAT”	  AND	  THE	  REVIEWABILITY	  BLIND	  SPOT	  
	  
Elsewhere,	   Professor	   Meazell	   has	   shown	   how	   substantive	   judicial	  
review	   encourages	   agencies	   to	   translate	   their	   scientific	   and	   technical	  
findings	   into	   sophisticated	   lay	   terms,	   leading	   her	   to	   warn	   about	   the	  
downsides	   of	   judicial	   deference	   in	   reviewing	   agency	   scientific	   and	  
technical	   decisions.7	   It	   seems	   uncontroversial	   that	   judicial	   review	  
provides	  courts	  and	  agencies	  a	  platform	  on	  which	  to	  talk	  to	  each	  other	  in	  a	  
common	   language,	   but	   Deference	   and	   Dialogue	   in	   Administrative	   Law	  
provides	   a	   much	   thicker	   account	   of	   dialogue	   as	   an	   approach	   to	   judicial	  
review	   in	   the	   risk	   regulation	   context,	   and	   especially	   for	   serial	   litigation	  
case	   families.	   In	   addition	   to	   translation,	   dialogue	   involves	   mutual	  
understanding,	  ongoing	  conversation	  and	  engagement	  and,	  perhaps	  most	  
importantly,	   an	   openness	   to	   learning	   by	   both	   agencies	   and	   courts.	   So	  
understood,	  dialogue	  holds	  some	  promise	  to	  improve	  agency	  decisions	  in	  
these	  contexts.	  	  
	  
Like	  others	  who	  endorse	  dialogue	  as	  an	  approach	  to	   judicial	  review,	  
Professor	   Meazell	   focuses	   on	   the	   value	   of	   dialogue	   for	   procedural	   and	  
substantive	   review	   of	   agency	   decisions.	   Her	   emphasis	   on	   how	   this	  
sometimes	   occurs	   through	   remands	   without	   vacation	   of	   the	   agency	  
decision	   describes	   a	   subset	   of	   important	   reversals,	   although	   it	   may	   not	  
explain	   many	   other	   cases	   where	   agencies	   vacate	   the	   agency	   decision	  
altogether.	   Moreover,	   by	   emphasizing	   remands	   following	   substantive	   or	  
procedural	   review,	   the	   dialogic	   account	   of	   judicial	   review	   in	  
administrative	   law	   courts	   suffers	   from	   a	   blind	   spot	   regarding	  
reviewability,	   or	   whether	   substantive	   review	   is	   available	   in	   the	   first	  
instance.	   A	   reviewability	   determination	   might	   be	   a	   part	   of	   dialogue—
particularly	   where	   a	   reviewing	   court	   invites	   an	   agency	   to	   do	   more	   to	  
address	   an	   issue—but,	   more	   troubling,	   it	   also	   can	   be	   a	   vehicle	   for	   both	  
agencies	  and	  courts	  to	  opt	  out	  of	  or	  delay	  dialogue.	  Consider	  that	  many	  of	  
Professor	   Meazell’s	   lead	   examples	   involve	   early	   challenges	   to	   agency	  
decisions	  in	  which	  litigants	  asked	  courts	  to	  review	  a	  delay	  in	  an	  agency’s	  
decisionmaking,	  which	  frequently	  is	  framed	  as	  review	  of	  agency	  inaction.	  
If	   a	   court	   chooses	   to	   review	   the	  matter,	   this	   could	  well	   invite	   a	  dialogue	  
through	  the	  remedy	  of	  remand.	  Instead,	  if	  a	  court	  were	  to	  treat	  the	  matter	  
of	  inaction	  as	  unreviewable,	  as	  occurs	  across	  a	  range	  of	  agency	  regulatory	  
 
7	  Emily	  Hammond	  Meazell,	  Super	  Deference,	  the	  Science	  Obsession,	  and	  Judicial	  Review	  as	  
Translation	  of	  Agency	  Science,	  109	  Mich.	  L.	  Rev.	  733	  (2011).	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enforcement	  and	  budget	  priority	  decisions,8	  presumably	  no	  dialogue	  at	  all	  
would	  occur	  between	  agencies	  and	  courts.	  	  
	  
More	   fundamentally,	   reviewability	   doctrines	   raise	   basic	   questions	  
related	   to	   the	   normative	   usefulness	   of	   dialogue	   in	   the	   first	   instance.	  
Professor	   Meazell	   is	   astutely	   aware	   of	   the	   burdens	   of	   judicial	   review,	  
including	  its	  costs,	  the	  prospect	  for	  delay,	  and	  how	  review	  can	  undermine	  
statutory	  objectives,	  and	  she	  takes	  seriously	  the	  dysfunctions	  these	  might	  
present.9	  Given	  the	  dialogic	  account’s	  focus	  on	  procedural	  and	  substantive	  
review	   in	   administrative	   law,	   however,	   common	   legal	   issues	   involving	  
reviewability	   remain	   unaddressed.	   Two	   particular	   legal	   issues	   that	   cut	  
across	   recurring	   doctrinal	   issues	   that	   arise	   in	   Professor	   Meazell’s	  
examples	  have	  historically	  been	  plagued	  by	  some	  reviewability	  limitations	  
on	  substantive	  judicial	  review:	  persistent	  agency	  inaction—as	  in	  recurring	  
failure	   to	   meet	   a	   statutory	   deadline—and	   preenforcement	   review	   of	  
agency	   rules—as	   occurs	   when	   a	   court	   is	   asked	   to	   review	   an	   agency	  
regulation	  or	  policy	  position	  after	  it	  is	  adopted	  but	  prior	  to	  its	  application.	  
The	   dialogic	   account	   seems	   to	   presumptively	   assume	   reviewability,	  
creating	   a	   blind	   spot	   in	   the	   dialogic	   account	   for	   important	   doctrines	  
related	  to	  agency	  inaction	  and	  preenforcement	  review.	  
	  
As	   to	   an	   agency’s	   ability	   to	   potentially	   opt	   out	   of	   dialogue,	  
reviewability	   doctrines	   such	   as	   exhaustion	   and	   finality	   provide	   agency	  
decisionmakers	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  to	  bypass	  judicial	  review,	  depending	  on	  
the	   procedural	   form	   an	   agency	   chooses	   to	   make	   its	   decision.	   Agency	  
inaction,	  as	  may	  occur	  in	  failure	  to	  enforce	  or	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  agency’s	  
delays	   in	   adopting	   regulations,	   has	   provided	   perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
visible	  historical	  examples	  of	  agency	  decisions	  evading	  review.10	  Professor	  
Meazell’s	   examples	   illustrate	   how	   in	  many	   instances	   statutory	   deadlines	  
can	   provide	   litigants	   a	   basis	   for	   convincing	   a	   court	   to	   review	   agency	  
failure	   to	   adopt	   regulations.	   Yet	   it	   is	   noteworthy	   that	   in	   many	   of	   these	  
serial	   litigation	  case	   families,	   the	   initial	  decision	   to	  entertain	   review	  was	  
not	   driven	   entirely	   by	   courts	   or	   agencies	   but	   was	   tied	   to	   a	   statutory	  
deadline	   that	   Congress	   adopted	   as	   a	   way	   to	   enable	   potential	   judicial	  
 
8	  See	  Lincoln	  v.	  Vigil,	  508	  U.S.	  182,	  193	  (1993)	  (treating	  as	  unreviewable	  agency’s	  decision	  
to	  discontinue	  funding	  for	  program	  out	  of	  its	  lump	  sum	  appropriation);	  Heckler	  v.	  Chaney,	  
470	  U.S.	  821,	  837–38	   (1985)	   (finding	  agency	  enforcement	  decision	   “committed	   to	  agency	  
discretion	  by	  law”	  under	  section	  701(a)(2)	  of	  the	  Administrative	  Procedure	  Act	  (APA)).	  
9	  See	  discussion	   in	  Meazell,	  Deference	  and	  Dialogue,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1780–84	  (discussing	  
problematic	  aspects	  of	  dialogue).	  
10	   See,	   e.g.,	   Lisa	   Schultz	   Bressman,	   Judicial	   Review	   of	   Agency	   Inaction:	   An	   Arbitrariness	  
Approach,	  79	  N.Y.U.	  L.	  Rev.	  1657,	  1658	  (2004)	  (noting	  “Supreme	  Court’s	  reluctance	  to	  allow	  
judicial	   review	   of	   [agency]	   inaction”);	   Michael	   D.	   Sant'Ambrogio,	   Agency	   Delays:	   How	   a	  
Principal-­‐Agent	  Approach	  Can	  Inform	  Judicial	  and	  Executive	  Branch	  Review	  of	  Agency	  Foot-­‐
Dragging,	  79	  Geo.	  Wash.	  L.	  Rev.	  1381,	  1388	  (2011)	  (“The	  weak	  and	  ad	  hoc	  judicial	  review	  of	  
agency	  delays	  creates	  opportunities	  for	  agencies	  .	   .	   .	  to	  thwart	  legislative	  mandates.”);	  Cass	  
R.	  Sunstein,	  Judicial	  Review	  of	  Agency	  Inaction	  After	  Heckler	  v.	  Chaney,	  52	  U.	  Chi.	  L.	  Rev.	  653,	  
653	  (1985)	  (describing	  agency	  inaction	  “traditionally	  shielded	  .	  .	  .	  from	  judicial	  review”).	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involvement	   in	   the	  matter	   in	   the	   first	   instances.	   Absent	   a	   congressional	  
deadline,	  or	  at	  least	  some	  requirement	  to	  adopt	  rules,	  it	  is	  much	  less	  likely	  
that	   such	   review	  would	  have	  been	   available.11	  Moreover,	   even	  where	   an	  
agency	   does	   choose	   to	   act	   and	   opts	   to	  make	   a	   decision	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  
tentative	  policy	  statement,	   rather	   than	  adopt	  a	  binding	  commitment	   in	  a	  
notice-­‐and-­‐comment	  rule,	  the	  agency’s	  preenforcement	  decisions	  may	  not	  
be	   characterized	   as	   ripe	   for	   review	   and	   could	   evade	   the	   substantive	  
scrutiny	   of	   courts	   altogether.12	   Under	   existing	   doctrine,	   such	   procedural	  
choices	  may	  allow	  an	  agency	  to	  avoid,	  or	  at	  least	  delay,	  substantive	  judicial	  
review.	  	  	  
	  
Reviewability	  doctrines	  can	  also	  provide	  a	  court	  a	  convenient	  way	  to	  
skirt	  dialogue	  with	  an	  agency	  altogether,	  by	  finding	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
claimed	   harm	   or	   injury	   is	   weak	   (as	   may	   occur	   with	   a	   finding	   of	   no	  
standing)	  or	  by	  holding	  that	  it	  does	  not	  have	  much	  to	  offer	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  
substance	   of	   review	   or	   the	   remedy	   (as	   may	   occur,	   for	   example,	   if	   a	  
reviewing	   court	   determines	   that	   a	   matter	   is	   committed	   to	   agency	  
discretion	  by	  law	  under	  the	  APA).13	  Thus,	  even	  when	  an	  agency	  does	  opt	  
to	  make	   a	   decision	   in	   a	   form	   that	   is	   reviewable,	   a	   court	   still	   could	   have	  
some	  ability	   to	  avoid	  hearing	  appeals	  of	  certain	  agency	  decisions.	  Courts	  
face	  incentives	  to	  avoid	  review	  of	  many	  agency	  decisions.	  To	  begin,	  federal	  
judges	   have	   limited	   resources	   and	   it	   is	   probably	   fair	   to	   say	   that	   most	  
judges	  have	   little	   appetite	   for	   the	   kinds	  of	   technical	   and	   scientific	   issues	  
that	  many	   agency	   appeals	   present—especially	   the	   kinds	   of	   complex	   and	  
technical	   risk	   issues	   Professor	   Meazell	   emphasizes	   in	   her	   Article.	   Even	  
where	   judges	   do	   have	   an	   appetite	   for	   such	   issues,	   they	   may	   see	  
institutional	  advantages	  to	  having	  an	  agency	  do	  more	  to	  develop	  a	  record	  
or	  address	  an	  issue	  before	  a	  court	  weighs	  in.	  	  
	  	  
Some	   of	   Professor	   Meazell’s	   examples	   highlight	   this	   reviewability	  
blind	   spot.	  OSHA’s	   original	   delay	   in	   setting	   standards	   for	   the	   carcinogen	  
known	  as	  hexavalent	  chromium	   initially	   resulted	   in	  no	   judicial	   review	  at	  
all,	   creating	   the	   practical	   effect	   of	   deference	   to	   OSHA’s	   priority	   setting	  
even	   though	   no	   court	   had	   applied	   substantive	   review	   standards.	   The	  
practical	  result	  here	  is	  analogous	  to	  a	  remand,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  a	  
reviewability	   determination	   is	   predialogue	   or	   is	   subject	   to	   critique	  
through	   the	   dialogical	   account	   of	   judicial	   review.	   If	   reviewability	   is	  
 
11	   In	   some	   instances	   agency	   failure	   to	   take	   action	   such	   as	   adopting	   a	   regulation	  may	   be	  
reviewable	   even	   where	   Congress	   did	   not	   adopt	   a	   specific	   deadline,	   based	   on	   reasons	   an	  
agency	   gives	   and	   their	   connection	   to	   the	   statutory	   program	   being	   addressed.	   See,	   e.g.,	  
Massachusetts	  v.	  EPA,	  549	  U.S.	  497,	  528–35	  (2007)	  (reviewing	  EPA	  failure	  to	  adopt	  rule,	  in	  
part	  because	  past	  findings	  agency	  had	  made	  would	  have	  required	  some	  agency	  action	  under	  
applicable	  statute).	  
12	  For	  a	   critique	  of	   this	  aspect	  of	   reviewability	  doctrine,	   see	  Mark	  Seidenfeld,	   Substituting	  
Substantive	  for	  Procedural	  Review	  of	  Guidance	  Documents,	  90	  Tex.	  L.	  Rev.	  331,	  332	  (2011)	  
(“[T]hose	   who	   favor	   giving	   agencies	   more	   leeway	   to	   use	   guidance	   documents	   have	   the	  
better	  argument.”).	  
13	  See	  supra	  note	  8	  (referencing	  cases	  on	  section	  701(1)(2)	  of	  APA).	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predialogue,	   then	   both	   agencies	   and	   courts	   have	   some	   fairly	   powerful	  
ways	  of	  opting	  out	  of	  the	  dialogic	  process	  altogether	  that	  might	  undermine	  
some	  of	  the	  normative	  goals	  dialogue	  purports	  to	  advance.	  Perhaps	  that	  is	  
a	  necessary	  extradialogic	  safety	  valve	  given	  the	  high	  costs	  judicial	  review	  
presents,	   but	   this	   seems	   to	   throw	   the	   baby	   out	  with	   the	   bathwater	   if	   it	  
leaves	   both	   agencies	   and	   courts	   ways	   of	   ending	   dialogue	   or	   avoiding	   it	  
altogether	   through	   persistent	   delay.	   If	   reviewability	   is	   predialogue,	   a	  
dialogic	   account	   of	   judicial	   review	   does	   not	   have	   any	   basic	   way	   of	  
critiquing	   an	   agency	   or	   court	   decision	   that	   evades	   review,	   and	   fails	   to	  
explain	   a	   major	   component	   of	   judicial	   review	   doctrine,	   including	   many	  
decisions	  that	  produce	  the	  practical	  effect	  of	  deference.	  	  
	  
Alternatively,	  a	  reviewability	  determination	  could	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  part	  
of	  the	  normative	  account	  dialogue	  that	  informs	  judicial	  review.	  I	  find	  this	  
approach	   more	   appealing	   than	   treating	   reviewability	   as	   a	   predialogic	  
safety	   valve,	   and	   I	   suspect	   Professor	   Meazell	   would	   as	   well.	   However,	  
incorporating	   reviewability	   into	  a	  dialogic	   account	  of	   judicial	   review	  has	  
important	  implications	  for	  administrative	  law	  that	  go	  far	  beyond	  arbitrary	  
and	   capricious	   and	   other	   substantive	   standards	   of	   review.	   Where	   an	  
agency	  makes	  a	  decision	  that	  is	  unreviewable,	  or	  where	  a	  court	  refuses	  to	  
entertain	   review	   of	   an	   agency	   decision	   or	   policy,	   the	   agency	   position	  
stands	  and	   the	  end	  product	  mimics	   the	   result	  of	   rational	  basis	   review.	   If	  
the	   result	   of	   de	   facto	   deference	   persists,	   the	   kind	   of	   dialogue	   a	   robust	  
judicial	   review	   requires	   could	   be	   impeded,	   but	   more	   time	   for	  making	   a	  
policy	  decision	  could	  also	  present	  an	  opportunity	  for	  greater	  learning	  for	  
the	  agency,	  consistent	  with	  a	  dialogic	  approach.	  Professor	  Meazell’s	  Article	  
focuses	   primarily	   on	   how	   dialogue	   can	   inform	   substantive	   review	  
standards	   under	   section	   706	   of	   the	   APA,	   such	   as	   the	   arbitrary	   or	  
capricious	   standard,	   and	   remedies	   such	   as	   remands	   without	   vacation.	  
Serial	   litigation	   also	  would	   seem	   to	   provide	   an	   excellent	   opportunity	   to	  
assess	   how	   reviewability—including	   treatment	   of	   agency	   inaction	   and	  
preenforcement	   decisions	   such	   as	   tentative	   policy	   statements—promote	  
or	  impede	  dialogic	  values.	  At	  least	  in	  constitutional	  law,	  where	  the	  dialogic	  
account	  of	   judicial	  review	  has	  had	  some	  normative	  success,	   the	  doctrinal	  
implications	  of	  dialogue	  have	  been	  extended	   to	  basic	  predicate	  decisions	  
regarding	   whether	   a	   court	   will	   decide	   a	   matter.14	   My	   sense	   is	   that	  
Professor	   Meazell	   intends	   such	   decisions	   to	   also	   be	   dialogic	   in	  
administrative	  law,	  but	  given	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  focus	  of	  her	  Article	  (like	  
many	  other	  dialogic	  approaches	  to	  judicial	  review)	  addresses	  substantive	  
standards	   of	   review,	   such	   as	   review	   under	   the	   basic	   arbitrary	   and	  
capricious	   standard,	   reviewability	   remains	   a	   blind	   spot	   for	   dialogic	  
accounts	  and	  there	  is	  some	  need	  for	  future	  work	  to	  address	  the	  doctrinal	  
 
14	   The	   classic,	   to	   which	   Professor	   Meazell	   refers,	   is	   Alexander	   M.	   Bickel,	   The	   Least	  
Dangerous	   Branch:	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   at	   the	   Bar	   of	   Politics	   (1962).	   Bickel	   advances	   an	  
account	  of	  judicial	  minimalism	  based	  on	  “passive	  virtues”	  and	  envisions	  courts	  staying	  out	  
of	  many	   important	   substantive	   questions	   involving	   the	  U.S.	   Constitution’s	  meaning.	   Id.	   at	  
199–200.	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and	   normative	   implications	   of	   dialogue	   for	   it.	   Dialogue	   might	   describe	  
some	   aspects	   of	   procedural	   and	   substantive	   review,	   but	   at	   a	   minimum	  
dialogue	   needs	   to	   be	   able	   to	   explain	   how	   declining	   review	   via	   the	  
reviewability	   doctrine	   enhances	   or	   decreases	   dialogue—especially	   given	  
the	  prominence	  of	  the	  passive	  virtues	  that	  are	  used	  to	  advance	  dialogue	  in	  
constitutional	  law.	  
	  
II.	  THE	  “WHO”	  OF	  REVIEW	  AND	  THE	  NEED	  TO	  CONFRONT	  POLITICS	  IN	  
SUBSTANTIVE	  REVIEW	  
	  
Modern	  dialogic	  accounts	  of	   judicial	  review	  in	  constitutional	   law	  are	  
also	   tied	   to	   a	   normative	   account	   of	   democracy	   known	   as	   “popular	  
sovereignty,”	   which	   provides	   answers	   to	   questions	   of	   constitutional	  
meaning	   by	   looking	   to	   an	   electoral	   process	   that	   gauges	   “the	   will	   of	   the	  
people.”15	   The	   “shared	   ends”	   of	   the	   conversation	   between	   courts	   and	  
agencies	   in	   administrative	   law	   are	   trickier.	   Most	   scholars	   who	   focus	   on	  
court-­‐agency	   dialogue	   in	   substantive	   judicial	   review	   of	   agencies	  
emphasize	   science	   and	   expertise,	   along	   with	   reasoned	   decisionmaking	  
regarding	   shared	   ends,	   as	   legitimating	   agency	   decisions.	   But	   the	   larger	  
question	   of	   how	   an	   agency	   and	   court	   are	   engaging	   in	   dialogue	   and	   how	  
this	   relates	   to	   theories	  of	   legitimacy	   in	  administrative	   law	  receives	  short	  
shrift	   in	   references	   to	  dialogue	  as	  a	  basis	   for	   judicial	   review	  of	   agencies.	  
For	  example,	  one	  dialogic	  benefit	  of	  judicial	  review	  is	  not	  the	  conversation	  
between	  the	  agency	  and	  a	  court	  after	  an	  agency	  has	  defined	  its	  regulatory	  
course	   of	   action,	   but	   how	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   judicial	   review	   might	  
encourage	   agencies	   to	   take	   more	   seriously	   public	   participation	   before	  
committing	  to	  a	  course	  of	  action	  in	  the	  first	  place.16	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  real	  
dialogue	  may	  not	  be	  between	  agencies	  and	  courts,	  but	  between	  agencies	  
and	  interest	  groups.	  
	  
Moreover,	   dialogue	   may	   have	   a	   larger	   audience	   among	   political	  
institutions	  in	  the	  conversation	  about	  shared	  ends.	  As	  Professor	  Meazell’s	  
examples	   illustrate,	   dialogue	   seems	   to	  be	  most	  descriptively	  powerful	   in	  
contexts	  where	  agency	  decisions	  undergo	  more	   iterations	   in	   response	   to	  
review	   and	   as	   longer	   periods	   of	   time	   pass	   during	   the	   appellate	   process.	  
Yet	  normatively,	  scenarios	  involving	  iterative	  appeals	  and	  protracted	  time	  
periods	  of	  a	  decade	  or	  more	  are	  likely	  to	  present	  the	  kinds	  of	  issues	  where	  
politics	  has	  multiple	  opportunities	  to	  influence	  agency	  decisions,	  through	  
 
15	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  dialogic	  approach	  to	  judicial	  review	  advanced	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  
a	  larger	  political	  theory	  of	  popular	  sovereignty,	  see	  Barry	  Friedman,	  The	  Will	  of	  the	  People:	  
How	   Public	   Opinion	   Has	   Influenced	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   and	   Shaped	   the	   Meaning	   of	   the	  
Constitution	  (2009).	  See	  also	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  The	  Supreme	  Court,	  1995	  Term, Foreword:	  
Leaving	  Things	  Undecided,	  110	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  4,	  33	  (1996)	  (recognizing	  how	  dialogic	  rules	  
are	  “democracy-­‐forcing”).	  
16	  See	  Richard	  Stewart,	  The	  Reformation	  of	  American	  Administrative	  Law,	  88	  Harv.	  L.	  Rev.	  
1667,	   1723–60	   (1975)	   (emphasizing	   how	   judicial	   review	   can	   advance	   interest	  
representation	  model	  of	  agency	  legitimacy).	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the	   possibilities	   of	   congressional	   or	   executive	   branch	   intervention.	  
Ironically,	   in	   those	  cases	  where	   the	  dialogic	  account	  appears	   to	  have	   the	  
greatest	   descriptive	   traction—instances	   where	   agencies	   face	   multiple	  
appeals	   and	   a	   long	   time	   span	   of	   back-­‐and-­‐forth	   between	   courts	   and	  
agencies—the	  increased	  relevance	  and	  likelihood	  of	  political	  intervention	  
could	   weaken	   dialogue’s	   normative	   traction	   in	   legitimating	   agency	  
decisions.	   As	   is	   illustrated	   by	   the	   examples	   of	   Endangered	   Species	   Act’s	  
listing	   the	   flat-­‐tailed	   horned	   lizard	   or	   the	   Mexican	   spotted	   owl,	   the	  
presence	   of	   dialogue	   may	   not	   really	   depend	   on	   the	   substance	   of	   any	  
agency’s	   decision	   at	   all,	   but	   on	   whether	   an	   agency	   is	   constrained	   by	  
congressionally-­‐mandated	   deadlines	   or	   procedures	   in	   making	   their	  
decisions.	  Such	  deadlines	  and	  procedures	  certainly	  may	  give	  participants	  
the	  ability	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  an	  agency’s	  decision	  through	  legalistic	  
judicial	  appeals	  consistent	  with	  court-­‐agency	  dialogue,	  but	  they	  also	  may	  
be	   fire	   alarms	   or	   other	   control	   instruments	   that	   have	   been	   planted	   by	  
political	   principals	   such	   as	   Congress	   or	   the	   President	   to	   monitor	   the	  
agency’s	  decisions.17	  
	  
Another	  set	  of	  examples,	  involving	  the	  setting	  of	  regulatory	  standards	  
by	   agencies,	   also	   highlights	   the	   significance	   of	   judicial	   review	   as	   an	  
opportunity	  for	  courts	  to	  not	  only	  speak	  to	  an	  agency	  but	  also	  to	  speak	  to	  
Congress	  or	  other	  political	  actors.	  OSHA’s	  setting	  of	  permissible	  exposure	  
limits	   for	  workplace	   toxins,	   such	  as	   the	   carcinogen	  known	  as	  hexavalent	  
chromium,	   was	   plagued	   by	   delays	   that	   spanned	   presidents	   of	   different	  
political	   parties	   and	   multiple	   elections	   for	   congressional	   members.	  
Consistency	   in	   the	   agency’s	   ultimate	   failure	   to	  make	   any	   decision	  might	  
have	  helped	   courts	   to	   sort	  out	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  politics	  or	   something	  
else	   was	   driving	   the	   process,	   and	   also	   may	   have	   given	   presidents	   and	  
multiple	  congresses	  many	  invitations	  to	  intervene	  if	  the	  agency’s	  position	  
was	   inconsistent	  with	   the	  pulse	  of	   the	  political	  principals	  who	  delegated	  
authority	   to	   OSHA	   in	   the	   first	   instance.	   Professor	   Meazell	   expresses	  
disappointment	   that	   OSHA’s	   ultimate	   adoption	   of	   hexavalent	   chromium	  
standards	  fell	  short	  of	  a	  “real	  dialogue”	  to	  the	  extent	  they	  did	  not	  address	  
or	   reference	   judicial	   opinions	   that	   reversed	  previous	   agency	  decisions.18	  
Yet,	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  multiple	  political	  criticisms	  of	  OSHA	  for	  failing	  
to	  regulate	  workplace	  safety	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  agency	  may	  have	  been	  more	  
concerned	  with	   engaging	   in	   a	   conversation	  with	   Congress,	   perhaps	   as	   a	  
 
17	  See	  Mathew	  D.	  McCubbins,	  Roger	  G.	  Noll	  &	  Barry	  R.	  Weingast,	  Administrative	  Procedures	  
as	   Instruments	  of	  Political	  Control,	  3	   J.L.	  Econ.	  &	  Org.	  243,	  254	   (1987)	   (“If	  procedures	  do	  
affect	   outcomes,	   political	   officials	   have	   available	   to	   them	   another	   tool	   for	   inducing	  
bureaucratic	   compliance.”);	   Mathew	   D.	   McCubbins,	   Roger	   G.	   Noll	   &	   Barry	   R.	   Weingast,	  
Structure	   and	   Process,	   Politics	   and	   Policy:	   Administrative	   Arrangements	   and	   the	   Political	  
Control	   of	   Agencies,	   75	   Va.	   L.	   Rev.	   431,	   468–81	   (1989)	   (arguing	   that	   ex	   ante	   procedural	  
limits	  are	  most	  effective	  way	  for	  political	  actors	  to	  control	  agencies).	  
18	  Meazell,	  Deference	  and	  Dialogue,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1759.	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way	  of	  warding	  off	  additional	  legislation	  that	  would	  interfere	  with	  agency	  
discretion	  to	  set	  priorities.19	  	  
	  
Another	  case	  family	  involving	  long-­‐standing	  delays	  in	  the	  adoption	  of	  
regulatory	   standards	   under	   the	   Clean	   Air	   Act	   also	   highlights	   the	  
significance	  of	  Congress.	  The	  Clean	  Air	  Act	  was	  amended	  in	  1990	  and	  has	  
been	   the	   subject	   of	   numerous	   congressional	   discussions,	   including	  
numerous	  discussions	  related	   to	   the	  regulation	  of	  emissions	   from	  power	  
plants	   and	   at	   least	   one	   bill	   that	   passed	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives.	  
While	   one	   concern	   may	   be	   that	   the	   EPA	   moved	   at	   a	   snail’s	   pace	   in	  
adopting	   standards	   regarding	   the	   NOx-­‐PSD	   program	   following	   the	   D.C.	  
Circuit’s	   1990	   rejection	   of	   that	   approach,20	   in	   the	   fifteen	   year	   period	   in	  
which	   the	   agency	   “did	   nothing”21	   a	   Democratic	   President	   took	   office,	   a	  
Republican	   President	   replaced	   him,	   and	   multiple	   congresses	   had	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   consider	   the	   issue.	   The	   D.C.	   Circuit’s	   suggested	  
hypothetical	  approach	  to	  EPA	  addressing	  the	  issue	  in	  1990—an	  approach	  
Professor	  Meazell	  critiques	  as	  potentially	  “overstep[ping]	  the	  judicial	  role	  
in	   administrative	   law”22—signaled	   to	   key	   political	   principals	   the	  
possibility	   of	   a	   court	   upholding	   potential	   NOx-­‐PSD	   standards.	   In	   the	  
following	   fifteen	   years,	   the	   D.C.	   Circuit’s	   suggested	   approach	   was	   never	  
rejected	  by	  Congress,	  and	   this	  could	  have	  given	   the	  EPA	  some	  assurance	  
that	  the	  court’s	  approach	  would	  not	  face	  a	  veto	  or	  political	  intervention	  by	  
key	  political	  principals.	  	  
	  
	  Incorporating	   interest	   group	   politics	   and	   political	   actors	   like	  
Congress	   and	   the	   President	   into	   a	   dialogic	   account	   of	   judicial	   review	   in	  
administrative	   law	  will	   be	   no	   easy	   task,	   as	   politics	   raises	  many	   difficult	  
questions	   of	   its	   own	   for	   administrative	   law.	   While	   many	   scholars	   see	  
courts	   as	   focusing	  on	  neutral	   reasons	   related	   to	  an	  agency’s	   technical	  or	  
scientific	   judgment	   to	   help	   legitimate	   an	   agency’s	   decisions,	   politics	   can	  
also	   play	   some	   legitimating	   role.	   Indeed,	   some	   scholars	   such	   as	   Kathryn	  
Watts	   have	   argued	   that	   politics	   should	   play	   an	   even	   more	   direct	   role	  
under	  section	  706’s	  arbitrary	  or	  capricious	   review	  of	  agency	  decisions.23	  
Extending	   dialogue	   to	   such	   substantive	   accounts	   is	   controversial	   and	  
would	   require	   attention	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   positions	   taken	   by	   both	  
Congress	  and	  the	  White	  House	  in	  judicial	  review.	  Yet	  even	  if	  politics	  is	  not	  
 
19	   For	   example,	   the	   topic	   of	   OSHA’s	   consistent	   failure	   standards	   was	   discussed	   in	   a	  
congressional	  hearing	   in	  2007.	   Is	  OSHA	  Working	  for	  Working	  People?:	  Hearing	  Before	  the	  
Subcomm.	  on	  Employment	  &	  Workplace	  Safety	  of	  the	  S.	  Comm.	  on	  Health,	  Education,	  Labor,	  
&	   Pensions,	   110th	   Cong.	   (2007),	   available	   at	   http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-­‐
110shrg35165/pdf/CHRG-­‐110shrg35165.pdf.	  
20	  Envtl.	  Def.	  Fund	  v.	  EPA,	  898	  F.2d	  183	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1990).	  
21	  Meazell,	  Deference	  and	  Dialogue,	  supra	  note	  3,	  at	  1771.	  	  
22	  Id.	  at	  1786.	  
23	  See	  Kathryn	  A.	  Watts,	  Proposing	  a	  Place	  for	  Politics	  in	  Arbitrary	  and	  Capricious	  Review,	  
119	  Yale	   L.J.	   2,	   8	   (2009)	   (“[W]hat	   count	   as	   ‘valid’	   reasons	  under	   arbitrary	   and	   capricious	  
review	  should	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  certain	  political	  influences	  from	  the	  President,	  other	  
executive	  officials,	  and	  members	  of	  Congress.”).	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an	  explicit	  consideration	  in	  arbitrary	  or	  capricious	  review,	  it	  still	  may	  have	  
some	   indirect	   role	   in	   normative	   assessments	   of	   substantive	   review.	   Lisa	  
Bressman,	  for	  instance,	  advances	  an	  approach	  to	  judicial	  review	  that	  sees	  
courts	   as	   attempting	   to	  mediate	   the	  decisions	   of	   political	   actors,	   at	   least	  
for	  procedural	  questions	  and	  issues	  related	  to	  statutory	  interpretation.24	  If	  
a	  dialogic	  account	  of	  judicial	  review	  in	  administrative	  law	  serves	  a	  similar	  
normative	   purpose	   to	   that	   in	   constitutional	   law,	   any	   robust	   theory	   of	  
judicial	  review	  needs	  to	  address	  not	  only	  dialogue	  as	  improving	  scientific	  
and	   technical	   judgments	   but	   also	   the	   role	   of	   interest	   group	   and	  
institutional	  politics	  in	  legitimating	  agency	  decisions.	  	  
	  
Confronting	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   in	   judicial	   review	   is	   not	   only	   of	  
theoretical	   interest	   for	   administrative	   law;	   it	   also	   will	   influence	   what	  
recommendations	   can	   be	   drawn	   for	   doctrines	   related	   to	   substantive	  
judicial	   review.	   For	   example,	   consider	   the	   use	   of	   judicially-­‐constructed	  
reasons	  to	  support	  an	  agency’s	  decision.	  Where	  the	  use	  of	  such	  reasons	  by	  
a	  court	  results	  in	  rejection	  of	  an	  agency’s	  decision	  and	  remand,	  they	  do	  not	  
violate	   the	   basic	   principle	   of	   Chenery,	   since	   the	   agency	   still	   retains	   the	  
power	   to	  make	  a	   choice	  on	   remand	  and	   to	   either	   adopt	  or	   engage	   those	  
reasons.	  Where	  the	  reasons	  involve	  an	  issue	  related	  to	  statutory	  meaning,	  
a	   court	  may	   be	   saving	   all	   litigants	   time	   by	   helping	   both	   litigants	   and	   an	  
agency	  to	  see	  what	  is	  and	  is	  not	  permissible	  under	  a	  statute,	  as	  understood	  
by	  a	  court.	  If	  what	  is	  being	  reviewed	  is	  a	  policy	  choice,	  and	  the	  court	  is	  not	  
convinced	   that	   the	   rationale	  provided	  by	   the	   agency	  meets	   the	   arbitrary	  
and	  capricious	  standard,	  a	  court	  might	  also	  be	  helping	  both	   litigants	  and	  
the	   agency	  by	  providing	   some	   reasoning	   that,	   in	   the	   court’s	   view,	  would	  
meet	  the	  arbitrary	  and	  capricious	  standard.	  This	  does	  not	  bind	  the	  agency	  
to	   that	   reasoning	   on	   remand,	   but	   it	   does	   let	   litigants	   and	   the	   agency,	   as	  
well	   as	   Congress,	   know	   what	   the	   court	   thinks	   would	   pass	   muster.	  
Especially	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   politics	   has	   a	   legitimizing	   role	   within	   the	  
dialogic	   account	   of	   judicial	   review,	   the	   kinds	   of	   hypothetical	   reasons	  
Professor	   Meazell	   warns	   courts	   to	   generally	   avoid	   in	   writing	   their	  
opinions	   are	   not	   necessarily	   inconsistent	   with	   a	   dialogic	   account	   of	  
judicial	  review	  in	  administrative	  law—particularly	  if	  they	  serve	  some	  kind	  
of	  signaling	  function	  for	  an	  agency,	  the	  President,	  or	  Congress.	  
	  
III.	  DIALOGUE’S	  ASSUMPTIONS	  ABOUT	  DEMOCRACY	  
	  
In	   its	   fascinating	   case	   studies	   of	   serial	   litigation,	   Dialogue	   and	  
Deference	   in	   Administrative	   Law	   presents	   an	   important	   challenge	   for	  
administrative	   law,	   and,	   in	  particular,	   for	   theories	  of	   judicial	   review.	  But	  
 
24	  See	  Lisa	  Schultz	  Bressman,	  Deference	  and	  Democracy,	  75	  Geo.	  Wash.	  L.	  Rev.	  761,	  764–65	  
(2007)	   (arguing	   that	   Court	   refusal	   to	   accord	   deference	   to	   agencies	   is	   motivated	   by	  
democratic	   concerns	   about	   political	   non-­‐accountability	   of	   other	   actors);	   Lisa	   Schultz	  
Bressman,	  Procedures	  as	  Politics	  in	  Administrative	  Law,	  107	  Colum.	  L.	  Rev.	  1749,	  1752–53	  
(2007)	   (“The	  Court	  has	  produced	   rules	   that	  bring	   agencies	   in	   line	  with	   the	   constitutional	  
structure	  by	  negotiating	  the	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  administrative	  process.”).	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the	   normative	   traction	   of	   dialogue	   for	   judicial	   review	   in	   administrative	  
law	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  agency	  decisions	  actually	  being	  engaged	  as	  
a	   part	   of	   the	   dialogue	   (specifically,	   whether	   courts	   have	   any	   basis	   for	  
participating	   in	   them	  at	   all),	   and	  when	   courts	   actually	  do	   speak	   through	  
judicial	  decisions,	  who	  courts	  and	  agencies	  think	  that	  they	  are	  speaking	  to	  
when	  they	  opt	  to	  engage	  in	  dialogue.	  Dialogue	  certainly	  may	  make	  mutual	  
conversation	  possible,	  but	  some	  court-­‐agency	  conversations	  probably	  are	  
not	   worth	   having	   at	   all	   while	   other	   conversations	   may	   be	   more	   about	  
improving	   public	   participation	   in	   the	   agency	   decisionmaking	   process,	   or	  
about	  the	  agency	  or	  court	  signaling	  something	  to	  invite	  possible	  action	  by	  
Congress	  or	  the	  President,	  than	  a	  cozy	  ongoing	  chat	  between	  a	  court	  and	  
an	  agency.	  The	  very	  idea	  of	  judicial	  review	  in	  administrative	  law	  eschews	  
judges	   endorsing	   the	   substantive	   goals	   behind	   regulation,	   making	   the	  
notion	  of	  “shared	  ends”	  in	  dialogue	  a	  bit	  of	  a	  misfit	  for	  administrative	  law.	  
Even	  if	  it	  does	  make	  sense	  to	  speak	  of	  courts	  as	  being	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  
conversation	  with	   an	   agency	   about	   shared	   substantive	   ends,	   any	   robust	  
normative	   theory	   of	   judicial	   review	   must	   also	   confront	   politics	   and	   the	  




Preferred	   Citation:	   Jim	   Rossi,	   Of	   Dialogue—and	   Democracy—in	  
Administrative	   Law,	   112	   COLUM.	   L.	   REV.	   SIDEBAR	   147	   (2012),	  
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/112/147_R
ossi.pdf	  
	  
